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INTRODUCTION
This report documents the work performed by Lockheed Martin Aeronautics (LM Aero) under NASA contract
NNL06AA08B, delivery order NNL07AB06T.  The Concept Development for Software Health Management (CD
SHM)programwasaNASAfundedeffortsponsoredbytheIntegratedVehicleHealthManagementProject,oneof
the four pillars of the NASA Aviation Safety Program.  The CDSHM program focused on defining a structured
approachtosoftwarehealthmanagement(SHM)throughthedevelopmentofacomprehensivefailuretaxonomy
thatisusedtocharacterizethefundamentalfailuremodesofsafetycriticalsoftware.
To enable the detection andmitigation of software errors through SHM, our approach is to treat software as
another system device that exhibits failure modes according to a canonical failure reference of legacy and
emerging safetycritical software. ManySHMconcepts stem from failuremodesandeffectsanalysis (FMEA)of
software in amanner similar to that used for hardware, however the failuremodes for software are notwell
known,andthetechniquesforapplyingasoftwareFMEAduringsystemdesignarenotwidelypublished[1],[2].
Our goal was to address these shortcomings by quantifying the scope, magnitude and types of fundamental
softwareerrors thatmanifest themselves throughout thedevelopmentofadvanced flightcritical software. We
developedourapproachintwophases:1)thecreationofataxonomyforfundamentalsoftwareanomaliesbased





The sourceofour studywas thedevelopmentof flightcritical software systems froma combinationof several
recent, advanced development and production programs.  The background information required for the
investigation and analysis was gathered from across various database systems and normalized to a common
database.Weusedtheresultingdatabaseasthesourceforourerrorclassificationandtaxonomydevelopment.
The analysis of the database was performed manually, as several subject matter experts read through and
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CLASSIFICATIONDETAILS



















There are four different sections from the anomaly reports that we receive from any given program. These
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SincewedonothaveanoutlineoftheCauseClassificationandRootFailure,wefirststartedwithasamplegroup
of anomaly reports to attempt to identify a pattern of Cause Classification and Root Failure. While we were
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COMPILERERROR
TheCompilerError isageneralclassoferrorthatiscreatedbythetools inthesoftwarebuildchain. Thatis,an














































The Documentation Error is a general class that defines errors in the documentation (requirements, design
documents,flowcharts,statecharts,architecturediagrams,etc.)thatleadtosoftwareanomaliesdownstreamin
theprocess.Therewerenoemergentpatternsfromthisstudytodefinespecificdocumentationerrortypeswith


























An ImplementationError isdefinedasageneralclassoferror throughwhicharequirementorsoftwarechange
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SELFTEST
As part of the development process for flightcritical systems, it is necessary to incorporate into the system a
sufficient suite of preflight tests that verify the suitability of the system relative to themission it is about to















withmoderate dependency.  Such errorsmay be obvious right at system powerup, while othersmay not be













































Anyerrors associatedwith theoperationof the systempurely from theperspectiveof theuserorpilot, under
normaloperatingconditions,fallundertheUser/Pilotclass.Thatis,errorsidentifiedthroughspecificflighttestsor
failureconditions—perhapsemployingapilotoruser—arenotconsideredUser/Piloterrors. Throughthisstudy,
therewereno instanceswhereanyactiononbehalfof theuserorpilotcausedasoftware failure thatwasnot
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ERRORANALYSIS
Oncewe identified theproper taxonomy,wewereable toperform someuseful analysison the resultantdata.
Thissectiondescribesouranalysisandthecorrespondingresults.
BACKGROUND
Similar tomany riskmanagement approaches3, our approach considers the primary drivers of probability and
severity.Wealsoaddathirddimension—thelikelihoodofdetection.Althoughsimilarinnametowhatonemay
encounter ina failuremodeandeffectsanalysisworksheet4, thisparametermeasureshow longagiventypeof




events thatalreadyexist andhave transpired rather thanestimatingaprobabilityofoccurrenceanda severity.
We then use the entire collectionof data tomakepredictive inferences and suggestions for solutions that can
mitigatehighriskareasthroughsoftwarehealthmanagement.
THERISKPRIORITYNUMBER
The Risk Priority Number (RPN) is a fundamental measure of risk associated with each failure type.   It is a
parameter,normalizedtoavaluebetween0and1000,whichclearlyindicatestherelativeriskpriorityofelements
withinthetaxonomy.Itiscalculatedas:































be considered highrisk.  Although this cutoff is open to




















A rollup the individual error types reveals some notable
observations about the individual error classes
themselves.Perhapsthemostnotableofwhichisthatthe
top three error classes—Algorithm, Data Handling and
System Integration—account forover70%ofall software
errors, as illustrated in the graph shown in Figure 10, at
right.
Notonlyarethetopthreeclassesthemostfrequent;with
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RPNCOMPONENTANALYSIS
At this point, we discuss the individual parameters of RPN for the failure class analysis.  The most dominant




Theoccurrenceparameter is themostdiscriminating factorofall the failureclasses.Figure3,above,showsthe
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SEVERITYPARAMETER
Theseveritydimension,illustratedinFigure4above,showsthatthedominantfailureclassisI/Osystem.Thatis,
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“algorithm: initialization logic” would all be related in the failures of initializing correctly to start a newmode
duringamode transition. Thishas shownup in concreteexampleswhereaprocess switched intoanewmode

Figure14–SystemIntegrationErrorProfile
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themorespecificfailuretype.  Thenwepulledtogethertheconnectedparts into logicalgroupingscenteredon
thelargestofthe17failureclasses.Severalofthe17failureclassesendedupsplitbetweenlogicalgroupings.
GROUNDRULES
















are Requirement, Configuration Management (CM), External Problems, Documentation, Algorithm, System
Integration/Communication,andSelfTest.
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Figure15showsthetoplevelorganizationof thesesevengroups.The“Requirements”category isat thecenter
becauseitaffectsvirtuallyalloftheothercategories.“ExternalProblems”categorydoesnotconsistexclusivelyof
softwareproblemsbuttheyareproblems
that require software modification to
overcome them. The “Algorithm”
category is the largest and contains a
concentration of highRPN failure types.
“System Integration/Communication” is
alsoalargecategorywithsomehighRPN
failure types.  The “SelfTest” category
has no highRPN failure types.
“Documentation” was a large category
only because we did not subdivide it.
Weleftthe“ConfigurationManagement”
categoryasastandaloneitembecauseitinvolveseverystepinthesoftwaredevelopmentprocess.Wecanlook











Figure 16 shows theDocumentation category.Documentation errors are in the top5%RPNdue to the rateof
occurrence.Thesefailuresaccountedforover11%ofthetotalfailures.Theseverityscorewasaverageandthe




others.  We did not try to determine if other failures
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Figure17showsthe
External Problems
category. It is a
“CatchAll”category
for a small number















Figure 18 shows the
Requirements category.
These are all system
integration problems.
Requirements rarely
conflict and are usually
clear enough.  They are
more likely to be
missing or incorrect.
Thereare twohighRPN
failure types.  The RPN










mostly due to the rate
of occurrence.  This is
the first category with
relationships between
failure types.  Several
“system integration”




management” failure types.   The two yellow blocks, “CM: implementation delay” and “CM: missing CR
implementation” are grouped together with the green “CM: requirement incorporation delay” to collect the
problemswithdelaysinalreadyapprovedchanges.Thiscollectionrelatestoseveral“systemintegration”failure
types, all having todowith incompatible softwareor interfaces.  The “system integration:missing SWupdate”
failuretypecanbecausedbythe“CM:implementationdelay”,or“CM:missingCRimplementation”failuretypes.





the relationship between algorithm design, interprocess communication, and requirements category.  It is the





The designs in that system should not require a great deal ofmodification in the normal design loop. Another
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forthenewmode.Inaddition,statevariablesmaynothavebeenresetcorrectlywhennewmodestartedrunning.
Several of the failure types group together.  In the upper left of the diagram is a set of three signal definition
problems, “data definition: lookup table data”, “algorithm: incorrect unit”, and “algorithm: incorrect signal”.
Theseareproblemswhichare interior to thealgorithmbut theycanbe influencedby the “system integration”
faulttypesof“systemintegration:missingdata”or“systemintegration:engineeringunitmismatch”. Thissetof
failure types can cause “algorithm: equation/calculation” failure types.  Another significant collection of failure
typesdealswiththerangeprocessingofsignals.Itconsistsofthe“algorithm:range”,“algorithm:threshold”,and
“algorithm:missinglimits”failuretypes. Thissetalsocaninfluencethe“algorithm:equation/calculation”failure





long time. Wehavealso included “algorithm:dead code” in this set although itmayhave relationships toCM
failuretypeswhichwehavenotestablishedyet.The“algorithm:resettiming”failuretypeisgreen.Ithasalow
occurrence rate but a high severity score.  It is influenced by the “algorithm: reset logic” failure type,which is
orangeduetoahighoccurrencerate. The“algorithm:resettiming”failuretypeissecondarytothe“algorithm:
reset logic” failure type. There is a significant set of discrete logic problems consisting of (listed in order of






are have significant RPN values.  The entire collection is “algorithm: failure detection”, algorithm: failure
reporting”, “algorithm: failure management”, “algorithm: failure isolation”, “algorithm: response to detected
failurecondition”,“interprocesscommunication:failuremanagement”,“datahandling:inputfaulttolerance”,and
“bus interface: bus initialization failure”.  At the lower left of the diagram is a large collection of lowRPN
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
Figure20–AlgorithmCategory
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SYSTEMINTEGRATION/COMMUNICATIONCATEGORY
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ThehighRPNrootfailureshereare“algorithm:datatransfer/message”,“datahandling:scalingfactor”,and“data
handling:memory address”,which account for about 4%, 4%, and 3% of the all the root failures, respectively.
ThesedatadictionaryinterfaceproblemscanbedealtwithusingsystemengineeringtoolssuchasSysMLorAADL.
The tools should be systemwide.  Parttask interface controls do not have the same benefits unless they are
coordinated. The“datahandling:scale factor” failuretypepoints tothedifficultyof tracking fixedpointscaling
correctly through all the engineering units, hardware interfaces, etc.  The engineering disciplines use different
units when they address fixed point scaling and bias.  Electrical diagrams will have Volts, current, and other
engineeringunits.Softwareengineerswantleastsignificantbit(LSB)values,fullrangemax/min,etc.Andallare
furthercomplicatedbybiases,bothphysicalandcomputational,alongtheway.Possiblyengineersneedatoolto
helpwith fixedpoint range,bias, scale,engineeringunits/LSB,etc. Several system integration/communication




diagram is a collection of missing interface items, “system integration: missing signals in ICD”, “bus interface:





type,anddatastructure. Thefinal largecollectionof failuretypes isthedatahandlingcollectiontothebottom
rightof thediagram.  Thesearedatadictionary issues. The “datahandling: scaling factor”and“datahandling:
memoryaddress”failuretypesarethemostsignificantbyfar.Theyhavebeendiscussedabove.
 
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SELFTESTCATEGORY
Figure 22 shows the SelfTest Category.  There arenohighRPN root failures hereandonly threemediumRPN
failuretypes.Themostseriousrootfailureistheyellow“outdatedrequirement”rootfailurewhichaccountsfor
slightlyover1%ofall the root failures. Thereare twoblue failure types, “selftest: values for test”and“tools:
algorithm”.Thesereflecttheproblemofgenerating“truthdata”fromthetoolsforuseintheselftest.Alltherest
oftheblocksaregreen.Atthetop,centerofthediagramareacollectionoftopleveldesignproblems.Theyare




requirements issues: outdated and unnecessary.  At the bottom right of the diagram are several issues with
modelingandgeneratingvalidtruthdata.
APPLICATIONOFDATAANALYSISRESULTSTOEVALUATINGFUTURETECHNOLOGIES
Thedataanalysis results canbeused toanalyze the impactof the technologies, for example,possibly applying
formalmethodstothealgorithms. Lookingat figure20, thealgorithmrelateddefectsareamixtureofdiscrete
logic errors like “algorithm: decision logic” and floatingpoint calculation errors like “algorithm: design”.  An
application of formal methods could be used to identify and remove discrete logic defects in the early
development stages.  In figure 20, formalmethodswould reduce the number of errors in “algorithm: decision

Figure22–SelfTestCategory





to the possible benefit of an automated datadictionary driving the
interfacegenerationtools.Additionally,evidencepointstothebenefits
ofhavingmodelbaseddesigntoolsthatencompasstheentiresystem.In
particular, requirements failure typesmay be reduced by using system level design tools like SysML or AADL.
ConflictingorimpreciserequirementswouldbespottedbyFormalMethodswhereitcouldbeapplied.Ingeneral
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Selection of the emerging technologies to be evaluated should be guided by the “lessons learned” in research
efforts such as VVIACS (Validation & Verification of Intelligent and Adaptive Control Systems), CerTA FCS CPI
(CertificationTechniquesforAdvancedFlightCriticalSystems–ChallengeProblemIntegration),andMCAR(Mixed
CriticalityArchitectureRequirements). Several technologies includingAutoCode,AutoTest, RapidPrototyping,
SystemModelBased,andSimulationBasedDesignarematureenoughtoalreadybeestablishedwithrecognized
benefits.
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